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ACT

CLAUSE-AGE DISCRIMINA-

HELD APPLICABLE TO STATES, UNDER-

MINING NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES V.

UsERY-EEOC v. Wyo-

ming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
In 1976, the Supreme Court in National League of Cities v.
Usery' invalidated a congressional regulation of commerce for the first
time in forty years. 2 In that case, a divided Court struck down the
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local government employees. 3 Invalidation of the Act was based upon an implied
tenth amendment state immunity against federal commerce regulation. 4 This state immunity defense has not been allowed in any subsequent cases 5 and has been eroded through the use of factual distinctions.' Not until EEOC v. Wyoming,7 however, was the Court able to
directly confront National League of Cities. In Wyoming, the Supreme Court sustained the validity of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as it applied to state and local government employees, 8
leaving National League of Cities a gutted shell.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA or
Age Act), as originally passed," prohibited discrimination against employees on the basis of age' 0 only in the private sector." In 1974,

426 U.S. 833 (1976).
The last such judicial invalidation of a congressional regulation of commerce occurred in
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). The first commerce clause case which sustained
New Deal legislation was NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). For a
historical analysis of the Supreme Court's treatment of the commerce clause during the past 40
years see Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative
Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977); Schwartz, National
League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power and State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1115 (1978); Comment, Commerce Power Limited to Preserve States' Role in the
FederalSystem, 30 RUTGERas L. REv. 152 (1976).
3 National League of Cities. 426 U.S. at 833.
4 Id. at 841-43.
See infra text accompanying notes 64-92.
I
Id.
103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
s Id.
Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)).
10 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976), provides:
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Congress amended the Act 12 to extend its coverage to employees of the
federal1 3 and state1 4 governments.
In EEOC v. Wyoming,' 5 the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) alleged a violation of ADEA as amended and
brought suit against the State of Wyoming on behalf of Bill Crump, a
state game warden supervisor who was involuntarily retired at age
fifty-five.'" The EEOC complaint alleged that the Wyoming State
Highway Patrol and Game and Fish Warden Retirement Act,' 7 which
permitted the retirement of game and fish department employees at
age fifty-five, 18 was invalid since its provisions were contrary to those
of ADEA. "IWyoming claimed that the provisions of ADEA were not
applicable to the states 20 on the grounds that Congress' power to pass
ADEA under the commerce clause 2' was subject to the external constraints of the tenth amendment 22 as interpreted in National League
of Cities.23 The EEOC, on the other hand, contended that National
It shall be unlawful for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
chapter.
Id.
The term "employer" was defined to exclude the federal or state governments or their
political subdivisions. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976).
11 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55, 78-80.
13 Section 28(b) of the 1974 amendments added a new provision, § 15, 29 U.S.C. § 633a
(1976 & Supp. V 1981), to the Act to include federal employees.
14 Section 28(a)(2) of the 1974 amendments changed the definition of employer in § 11(b) of
the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976), to include state governments and their political subdivisions.
15 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
16 Id. at 595-96. The EEOC complaint sought injunctive and declaratory relief.
1" WYO. STAT. §§ 31-3-102 to -121 (1977).
18 Id. at § 31-3-107(c). The statute reads "[a]n employee may continue in service on a yearto-year basis after. . . age fifty-five (55), with the approval of employer and under conditions as
the employer may prescribe." Id. Mandatory retirement is required at age 65. Id. at § 31-3107(d). The Wyoming Act applies to full time law enforcement officers, id. at § 31-3-102(a)(iv),
and Wyoming Game and Fish Wardens are considered law enforcement officers. WYo. STAT. §§
7-2-101, 9-3-402(a)(viii), 23-6-101 (1977).
11 Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. at 596.
20 Id.
" "The Congress shall have power . .. [t]o regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
22 "rhe powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
23 426 U.S. at 833; see infra text accompanying notes 37-63.
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League of Cities merely invalidated the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) 24 as it applied the minimum wage-maximum hour provisions
to the states 25 and was not applicable to ADEA. 28 The EEOC further
maintained that passage of the Age Act was independently supported
27
by section five of the fourteenth amendment.
The district court rejected the EEOC claim that the state immunity doctrine articulated in National League of Cities was meant to be
narrowly construed.2 8 Citing the broad language used by Justice
Rehnquist in NationalLeague of Cities,2 the district court focused on
"whether Congress . . . has impaired, altered or displaced State policies or functions essential to its separate and independent existence. "30
District Judge Brimmer determined that game wardens provided a
service traditionally rendered by the states 31 and that invalidation of
the Wyoming compulsory retirement statute would financially burden the State by forcing it to maintain the personnel an additional ten
years. 32 Accordingly, Judge Brimmer granted Wyoming's motion to
dismiss, holding that application of ADEA to state game wardens
33
would violate the tenth amendment.
The United States Supreme Court, after noting probable jurisdiction, 34 accepted a direct appeal from the Commission. 35 In EEOC v.
Wyoming, a divided Court reversed and remanded, distinguishing

24

29 U.S.C, §§ 201-216b (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

22 The EEOC claimed that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the tenth amendment state

immunity doctrine in National League of Cities was narrowly drawn. The Commission cited the
National League of Cities Court's reaffirmation of Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) and
United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) for support. Brief for the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission at 8, EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for appellant); see infra note 97.
" Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. at 597.
27 Id. at 598. The EEOC argued that the congressional history of ADEA as well as the nature
of the regulations in the Age Act support the view that Congress understood ADEA to be
supported by both section five of the fourteenth amendment as well as by the commerce clause.
Brief for appellant, supra note 25, at 23-27; infra note 183 and accompanying text.
28 Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. at 598.
29 Id.
10 Id. at 600.
31 Id. Judge Brimmer cited to the language used by Justice Rehnquist in National League of
Cities which identified "police protection" and "parks and recreation" as being areas in which
the states have traditionally provided services. Id. (quoting 426 U.S. at 851).
32 Id.
33 Id. Judge Brimmer also dismissed the EEOC's fourteenth amendment argument on the
basis that nothing in the statute or in the legislative history of the Act "states that Congress was
acting pursuant to its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
3
EEOC v. Wyoming, 454 U.S. 1140 (1983).
31 The Commission invoked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976) on the basis that the
question of the constitutionality of ADEA was substantial. Jurisdictional Statement at 1, 4-14,
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National League of Cities on the basis that the degree of federal
intrusion by ADEA in Wyoming was significantly less serious than
36
that by FLSA.
II.

BACKGROUND:

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES V. USERY
AND ITS PROGENY

The National League of Cities decision 37 struck down the Fair
Labor Standards Amendments of 197438 which extended federal minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to almost all state employees. 39 Speaking for a five to four majority, 40 Justice Rehnquist conceded that Congress had the power to preempt state law in the private
sector and even to regulate purely intrastate activity where such activity affects interstate commerce. 4' The majority nevertheless held that
enactment of the amendments extending the law's applicability to the
public sector exceeded Congress' commerce power by intruding upon
state sovereignty. 49 The National League of Cities Court admitted
that the 1974 FLSA amendments were "undoubtedly" within Congress' commerce power, 43 but recognized an express limitation in the

EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983). 28 U.S.C. § 1252 provides that "[a]ny party may
appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any
court of the United States ... holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action ...

to which the United States , . . is a party." Id.

" Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
" National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 833.
38 Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-216b (1970 & Supp. III
1973)).
" The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060, specifically
exempted state and local government employees from its coverage. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the 1938 version of FLSA under Congress' commerce power in United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). The 1974 amendment extended the coverage by redefining employer to include a public agency, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1976), which in turn was defined as
including the federal and state governments. 29 U.S.C. § 203(x)(1976). As originally passed, it
was this same 1974 amendment which redefined § 11(b) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to also include within the definition of employer the state government and its political
subdivisions, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(1976), and which added § 15 to ADEA to extend coverage of
the Act to employees of the federal government, 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
4 Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and
Powell. Justice Brennan wrote for the dissent and was joined by Justices White and Marshall.
Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 833.
"' Id. at 840.
42 Id. at 852. The Supreme Court thereby reversed the judgment of the district court. The
lower court did note that it considered the question of law substantial but felt compelled to
dismiss the complaint because of the precedent set by Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826, 827 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd and remanded sub nom. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); see infra notes 50-52
and accompanying text.
" National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 841.
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tenth amendment 44 upon Congress' otherwise "plenary power."4 5 The
Court reasoned that such a restraint is imposed when congressional
power is applied to the states in their sovereign capacities in such a
manner as to "directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. ' 4
Drawing a line between traditional and nontraditional state activities, 47 Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the invalidation of the
FLSA amendments in National League of Cities was consistent with
previous validations of federal commerce regulation in areas of nontraditional state activities such as state-operated railroads. 48 The National League of Cities majority, unable to distinguish the traditional
government activity at hand 49 from that in Maryland v. Wirtz, 50 in

11Id. at 842. In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), Justice Stone stated that
the tenth amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."
This view was qualified in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975), where the
majority opinion stated that "[w]hile the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a 'truism,'
. . . it is not without significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy
that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their
ability to function effectively in a federal system." The National League of Cities Court referred
to this language in Fry to invalidate extension of FLSA to the states. 426 U.S. at 842-43.
41 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842. Justice Rehnquist drew a parallel between
Congress' commerce power and its taxing power, both powers which are delegated in art. I, § 8.
He reasoned that since the recognized state immunity to the federal taxing power is based upon
state sovereignty, a similar state immunity based on state sovereignty -should apply to the
commerce power. Id. at 844 n. 14. Application of the same implied constitutional limitation to
both the taxing and the commerce powers has been severely criticized. See Comment, supra note
2, at 165-69.
11 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852. In determining whether essential activities of a
state were impaired, Justice Rehnquist focused on the economic impact FLSA would have upon
the state. Id. at 848. He concluded that the wage regulation would restrict the state's choice in
determining the manner in which their employees worked and would restrict the delivery of
services by reducing the employees to a number affordable under the minimum wage. Id.
11 Id. at 851. As examples of such traditional activities performed by state and local government, Justice Rehnquist suggested "such areas as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation,
public health, and parks and recreation." Id. For examples of nontraditional state activities, see
infra note 48.
11 NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854 n.18. The Court maintained that its decision in
National League of Cities did not affect the validity of California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957)
(Railway Labor Act); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (Safety Appliance Act); or
Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (Federal Employers' Liability Act). Justice
Rehnquist maintained that the application of these federal statutes to employees of state-owned
railroads was not affected since the operation of a railroad was not considered a traditional state
function. 426 U.S. at 854 n.18.
Use of a traditional/nontraditional dichotomy test to determine state immunity has been
widely criticized as untenable. See Kilberg & Fort, National League of Cities v. Usery: Its
Meaning and Impact, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 613, 615 n.23 (1977); Comment, At Federalism's
Crossroads:National League of Cities v. Usery, 57 B.U.L. REv. 178, 192-93 (1977); Comment,
supra note 2, at 169; Note, National League of Cities v. Usery: Its Implicationsfor the Equal Pay
Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 10 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 239, 248-54(1977).
40 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855.
- 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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which the Court upheld two earlier FLSA amendments extending
coverage to employees of state-owned hospitals and schools, 51 overruled Wirtz. 52 Significantly, the National League of Cities Court also
added that it "express[ed] no view as to whether different results
might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state
governments by exercising authority granted it under other sections of
the Constitution such as the spending power, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, or § 5
'5 3
of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Justice Rehnquist was careful to distinguish Fry v. United
States,5 4 which upheld under the commerce power a national wage
freeze as it applied to state employees.55 The National League of Cities
Court reasoned that the wage freeze in Fry was a temporary emergency measure which displaced "no state choices as to how governmental operations should be structured," and acted to reduce rather
56
than increase pressures on state budgets.
Justice Blackmun, concurring, interpreted National League of
Cities as adopting a "balancing approach" which did not rule out
" In 1961, Congress amended FLSA to include not only employees individually engaged in
interstate commerce but also employees in "enterprises" engaged in commerce. Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 2(s), 75 Stat. 65 (amending 29 U.S.C. §
203(d) (1964 & Supp. 11 1966)).
In 1966, Congress removed the exemption extended to the states with respect to employees
in a hospital, institution, or school. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89601, § 102(b), 80 Stat. 830 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1964 & Supp. 11 1966)). The Wirtz
Court sustained the validity of these two amendments. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 183.
12 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854-55.
Justice Rehnquist in National League of
Cities stated "there are obvious differences between the schools and hospitals involved in Wirtz,
and the fire and police departments affected here," id. at 855, but then he declined to distinguish
the cases on these grounds, rather finding that "each provides an integral portion of those
governmental services which the States and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens." Id.
" Id. at 852 n.17. The Court expressed their view four days later on the plenary power of
section five of the fourteenth amendment in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Justice
Rehnquist, again speaking for the majority, sustained the 1972 amendments of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act which extended coverage of the Act authorizing private damages actions for
discrimination in employment to state and local government employees. In contrast to National
League of Cities, the Fitzpatrick Court held that:
[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In that section Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce "by
appropriate Legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. When Congress
acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary
within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one
section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms
embody limitations on state authority.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 455, 456 (1976) (citations omitted).
-4 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
" Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
"o National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852-53.
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federal regulation in areas of traditional state activity when the "federal interest is demonstrably greater" than that of the states' and
where state compliance is essential to the federal goal. 57 Justice Blackmun cited the majority's reasoning in upholding Fry to support this
58
approach.
Justice Brennan, in a bitter dissent, 59 reviewed the history of the
Court's decisions and found no constitutional basis to support the
majority's holding that state sovereignty is a restraint on the commerce clause.60 The dissent reasoned that the tenth amendment provides no basis for distinguishing between private parties and the states
insofar as federal commerce regulation is concerned. 6' Justice Brennan
argued that the only limitation upon the commerce power as it affects
state sovereignty is the political process itself. 62 The dissent further
described Justice Blackmun's balancing approach as "a thinly veiled
rationalization for judicial supervision of a policy judgment that our
63
system of government reserves to Congress.
Five years later in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,64 Justice Marshall, speaking for the majority,6 5 articulated a three-prong test that a state claim for immunity from a

57 Id: at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun also noted that such an approach
would not affect federal regulation in the area of environmental protection. Id.
" Id. Similarly, Justice Stevens, dissenting, assumed the Court would uphold federal legislation
requir[ing] the State to act impartially when it hires or fires [an employee], to
withhold taxes from his paycheck, to observe safety regulations when he is performing his job, to forbid him from burning too much soft coal in the capitol furnace,
from dumping untreated refuse in an adjacent waterway, from overloading a stateowned garbage truck, or from driving either the truck or the governor's limousine
over 55 miles an hour.
Id. at 880 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens could not distinguish these federal regulations
from the provisions of FLSA. Id. at 881 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
-1 Justices White and Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's dissent. Id. at 856.
60 Id. at 858-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 861-63, 868 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Rather the dissent argued that the tenth
amendment merely recognizes that Congress may not go beyond the limit of its delegated powers
and hence prevent the states from exercising their reserved powers. Id. at 862 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
62 Id. at 857-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also criticized as "conceptually
.unworkable" the traditional/nontraditional state activities test and the majority's "inability to
articulate any meaningful distinctions among state-operated railroads, state-operated schools
and hospitals, and state-operated police and fire departments." Id. at 880 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
- 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
65 Only Justice Rehnquist did not join the majority opinion but filed a separate opinion
concurring in the judgment. While joining the majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell also filed concurring opinions. Id.
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federal commerce regulation must meet to survive under the reasoning of National League of Cities.-" The Hodel Court summarized the
requirements of state immunity to be that the federal statute: 1)
regulate the " 'States as States' "; 2) pertain to definite " 'attribute[s]
of state sovereignty' "; and 3) directly hinder the state's capacity " 'to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions.' -07 Referring to Justice Blackmun's "balancing approach,"
Justice Marshall added that even if the requirements of this threepronged test were met, "[t]here are situations in which the nature of
the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission. "6
In Hodel, the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 197769 was challenged as a violation of the National League of Cities doctrine. 70 The Surface Mining Act prescribed
environmental performance standards for coal mine operators 7' which
were to be enforced either by the state (if it so elected) 72 or by the
Secretary of the Interior. 73 Without reaching the balancing step, the
Court maintained that the first requirement of the test had not been
satisfied and therefore the tenth amendment challenge to the Act
could not succeed. 74 The Court found the provisions of the Act to be
directed at private individuals rather than the "States as States" and
thus considered it immaterial whether the Act interfered with the
75
states' "traditional governmental function" of regulating land use.
The Hodel Court reasserted that Congress may displace or preempt
the police powers of the state insofar as they regulate private activities
76
affecting interstate commerce.
86 Id. at

286-87.

Id. (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854, 845, 852).
6 Id. at 288 n.29.
"I Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 515, 91 Stat. 445.
70 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 268. The district court ruled that § 515(d) and (e) of the Surface Mining
Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d)-(e) (Supp. V 1981), were in violation of the tenth amendment under
the principle of National League of Cities. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass'n v.
Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 435 (W.D. Va. 1980), aJf'd in part, revd in part and remanded sub
nom. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
71 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d)-(e) (Supp. V 1981). These provisions are concerned with surface
mining on "steep slopes." A sister case, Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981), decided the same
day, was concerned with 15 other substantive provisions of the Act. These so-called "prime
farmland" provisions were also held constitutional on the same basis as the "steep slope"
provisions.
12 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (Supp. V 1981).
73 Id. at § 1254.
74 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288.
75 Id. at 288-93.
76 Id. The Court maintained that since Congress could displace the states entirely in the area
of surface coal mining, Congress could also permit the states a role in the regulation. Id. at 290.
17
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One year after Hodel, a tenth amendment challenge was brought
in United Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R., 77 in which a
railway union argued that its dispute with the state-owned railroad
was covered under the Federal Railway Labor Act, 78 which permitted
strikes after a thirty-day cooling off period. 79 The Long Island Railroad claimed immunity from the federal Act under the principle of
National League of Cities80 and maintained that the union was subject
to New York's Taylor Law,8 which prohibits strikes by public employees.8 2 Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger recited the Hodel three-prong test and held that the third requirement
of the test had not been satisfied. 83 The Court reasoned that "[o]peration of railroads is not among the functions traditionallyperformed by
state and local governments. Federal regulation of state-owned rail8' 4
roads simply does not impair a state's ability to function as a state.
Also in 1982, in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi (FERC), 5 the State of Mississippi and the Mississippi Public
Service Commission challenged certain provisions of the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) .86 Titles I and III of PURPA
required state utility regulatory commissions to consider certain federal rate standards8 7 and section 210 of Title II required the state
88
public service commissions to resolve disputes arising under the Act.
" 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
45 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
79 United Transp. Union, 455 U.S. at 680-81.
80 Id. at 683.
81 N.Y. Civ. SEsv. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney's 1983).
82 United Transp. Union, 455 U.S. at 680-81. The district court ruled that the railroad was
subject to the Railway Labor Act and held that the union was entitled to a declaratory
judgment. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 509 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 634
F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 455 U.S. 678 (1982). The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed, under the rationale of National League of Cities, holding that the
operation of a railroad was an "integral governmental function" and that the federal interest, in
this context, is not "demonstrably greater" than that of New York State. United Transp. Union v.
Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
83 United Transp. Union, 455 U.S. at 684.
84 Id. at 686 (emphasis in original). The Court pointed out that when the State acquired the
railroad, it did so with the understanding that the railroad was subject to federal regulation. Id.
at 689. Moreover, just as traditional state functions may not be usurped by the federal government, the state government may not erode areas of federal authority by acquiring functions
formerly carried out in the private sector. Id. at 687.
85 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
88 Titles I and III and § 210 of Title II of the Act were challenged, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2644
78

(Supp. V 1981), 15 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3211 (Supp. V 1981), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (Supp. V 1981).
87 FERC, 456 U.S. at 745. Titles I and III of PURPA provided that the states mandatorily
consider the specific federal rate designs. Id. at 746. The states however were not required to
adopt the federal rate scheme. Id. at 749-50.
88 Id. at 750-51. Congress' attempt to utilize state regulatory machinery to promote federal
goals presented an issue of first impression. Id. at 758-59. In an unreported opinion, the district
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Justice Blackmun, writing for the FERC majority, 89 did not explicitly
refer to the Hodel test 90 but concluded that since Congress may entirely preempt the private sector in the public utilities area, "PURPA
should not be invalid simply because, out of deference to state authority, Congress adopted a less intrusive scheme and allowed the States to
continue regulating in the area on the condition that they consider the
suggested federal standards." 9' Upholding the section 210 requirement
that state authorities adjudicate disputes arising under the statute, the
Court found that "[d]ispute resolution of this kind is the very type of
activity customarily engaged in by the Mississippi Public Service Commission.92
III.

WYOMING COURT'S VIEW: NATIONAL

LEAGUE

OF CITIES DISTINGUISHED

In EEOC v. Wyoming, as in National League of Cities, the
Supreme Court was again faced with the issue of tenth amendment
state immunity against a congressional commerce clause regulation in
the area of state employment.9 3 Justice Brennan, speaking for a fivejustice majority, 94 interpreted National League of Cities to stand for
"a functional doctrine . . . whose ultimate purpose is not to create a
sacred province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique

court ruled that Congress had exceeded the scope of its commerce powers in enacting PURPA.
Id. at 752.
89 Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens. Justice
Powell concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist, concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. Id. at 742.
0 Justice Blackmun made no reference to the Hodel test in the text but rather mentioned it in
a footnote. Id. at 763 n.28. This omission seems significaut since the dissent comments that "[tihe
Court sidesteps this analysis." Id. at 781 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 765 (emphasis in original). Justice Blackmun emphasized that this does not mean
that a tenth amendment challenge to congressional interference with the state's structuring of
employer-employee relationships, as in National League of Cities, is foreclosed. Id. at 769 n.32.
12 Id. at 760. The Court noted that "state courts have a unique role in enforcing the body of
Id.
I..."
at 760 (citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947)). By analogy, the
federal law .
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Court reasoned that the Mississippi Commission must respect federal policy and the jurisdiction it is granted over disputes under PURPA. Id.
at 760-61.
11 Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1054. The 1974 FLSA amendments extended coverage of ADEA
to state and local employees. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a),(b), 88 Stat. 55, 78-80 (amending 29
U.S.C. §§ 630(b), 633a (1970)); see supra notes 12-14 & 39. Although FERC, United Transportation Union, and Hodel all involved tenth amendment state immunity challenges against commerce clause regulation, none involved state employment decisions and therefore were readily
distinguishable on their facts from National League of Cities. See supra notes 64-92.
11 Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in Justice Brennan's opinion.
Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1054.
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benefits of a federal system in which the States enjoy a 'separate and
independent existence' not be lost through undue federal interference
9 5
in certain core state functions.The Court summarized the Hodel test and conceded that the first
requirement, that the challenged statute regulate the "States as
States," was met here. 96 Justice Brennan observed that the meaning of
the second requirement, which questions whether the regulation involves matters that are an " 'undoubted attribute of state sovereignty,' " was not entirely clear. 97 The Wyoming Court, however,
stated that it was unnecessary to resolve the second prong of the test,
since the third requirement was not satisfied in that the Age Act did
not " 'directly impair' the State's ability to 'structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.' "198
In so holding, the Supreme Court distinguished Wyoming on the
basis that "the degree of federal intrusion" caused by the provisions of
ADEA was "sufficiently less serious than it was in National League of
Cities. " While observing that state park management has been recognized as a "traditional state function," the Court nevertheless maintained that the state was not being forced to abandon its goal of
maintaining the physical preparedness of its game wardens but only
being required to achieve this goal in a more careful and individualized way.' 00 Moreover, in contrast to National League of Cities, the
state's choice of means for carrying out its goal was "not being overridden entirely" since the state could continue in its practice if it could

95 Id. at 1060 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 71, 76 (1869)). The
Wyoming Court cited FERC, United Transportation Union and Hodel to support this "functional doctrine" idea. Id.
96 Id. at 1061. Justice Brennan emphasized that the first requirement of the Hodel test,
which requires the challenged statute to regulate the "States as States," "marks it as a specialized
immunity doctrine rather than a broad limitation on federal authority." Id. at 1061 n.10.
97 Id. at 1061 n.11 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845). The Wyoming
majority noted that neither National League of Cities nor subsequent cases involving the tenth
amendment state immunity had clearly defined this concept. Justice Brennan also added that not
"every state employment decision aimed simply at advancing a generalized interest in efficient
management-even the efficient management of traditional state functions-should be considered to be an exercise of 'an undoubted attribute of state sovereignty.' " Id.
"I Id. at 1061-62. The Court noted that even if ADEA did not survive the third requirement
of the Hodel test, "it might still" survive the balancing test. In response to Wyoming's position
that ADEA should not survive the balancing test because no substantial federal interest existed,
as evidenced by federal retirement statutes nearly identical to the Wyoming statute, the Court
answered that the degree of federal interest was not lessened by the "ebbs and flows of political
decisionmaking." Id. at 1064 n.17.
99 Id. at 1062.
100Id.
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show that age is a "bona fide occupational qualification" for game
wardens. 1 0'
The majority focused upon the financial impact of a federal
regulation as having the most substantial and tangible effects on a
state's ability to structure its operations.10 2 Any increased costs caused
by ADEA in terms of higher wages and benefits to be paid to older
workers, the Court reasoned, might be offset by the additional pension contributions paid by the older workers together with the likelihood that such workers, after retiring, would receive pension benefits
for fewer years.10 3 Since the Court concluded that extension of ADEA
to state and local governments was a valid exercise of Congress' commerce power, it declined to decide whether ADEA could have been
0 4
upheld under section five of the fourteenth amendment.1
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens reasoned that, because of
broad, sweeping economic change during the past century which has
resulted in interdependence between employment in the private and
public sectors, a proper reading of the Constitution would hold that
congressional regulation of the labor market may require regulation of
both sectors.'105 He based this contention on the historical observation
that the Founding Fathers' "principle purpose" when drafting the
Constitution was to grant the commerce power to the federal government and to eliminate trade barriers among the states.1 ° 6 Justice
Stevens maintained that no provision in the Constitution, including
the tenth amendment, supported the state immunity limitation on
Congress' commerce power as articulated in National League of Cit-

101Id.
102 Id. at 1062-63. The Wyoming Court cited the National League of Cities definition that the
"test of such financial effect" does not depend upon "' particularized assessments of actual
impact,' which may vary . .. but on a more generalized inquiry, essentially legal rather than
Id. at 1063 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851-52).
factual .
1013
Id. To offset any, higher costs for health benefits for older employees, Congress included a
provision in ADEA which required that the health benefits of older employees not necessarily be
identical to those of younger employees. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
The Wyoming Court noted that in some cases there might be nonfinancial collateral goals
which might be affected by the federal regulation; however, Wyoming claimed no such goals for
their mandatory retirement statute. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1063-64.
04 Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1064. In a footnote, the Court reaffirmed that the same tenth
amendment restraints do not apply when Congress acts pursuant to section five of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 1064 n. 18. The Supreme Court also noted that the district court incorrectly
disposed of the section five argument on the basis that Congress did not expressly articulate any
intention to use that power. See supra note 33. The majority maintained that the validity of
congressional regulations is not dependent upon a recitation of the powers under which Congress
acts. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1064 n.18; see also Brief for appellant, supra note 25, at 21-22.
10sWyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1066-67 (Stevens, J., concurring).
106 Id. at 1064-66 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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ies. 10 Concluding that this restraint on the commerce clause was
"pure judicial fiat," Justice Stevens called for the overruling of Na8
tional League of Cities.10
Chief Justice Burger, in a lengthy dissent, 0 9 contended that application of ADEA against the states was supported by neither the
commerce clause nor section five of the fourteenth amendment." 0
Examining the constitutionality of ADEA under the commerce clause,
the dissent concluded that the provisions of ADEA met all three
requirements of the Hodel test."' Not only did the Chief Justice find
ADEA to regulate the "States as States," '"1 2 but he also found it to
address matters that are attributes of state sovereignty."13 The dissent
stressed that parks and recreation services were recognized in National
League of Cities as traditional areas of state activities immunized by
the tenth amendment." 4 Turning to the third Hodel requirement,
Chief Justice Burger focused upon the additional financial burdens
imposed upon the states by the Age Act (i.e., those costs arising from
increased wages, pension benefits, and disability and health insurance
paid for by the employer retaining the older employee)1 5 and concluded that the Act impaired "the state's ability to structure its integral governmental operations."" 6 Nor did the dissent find that ADEA
survived Justice Blackmun's balancing test.1 7 The Chief Justice reasoned that the state's interest in exercising its police power over its
parks and recreation services outweighed the federal interest of not

' Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., concurring).
108 Id.
log

Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined in Chief Justice Burger's dissent. Id. at

1068.
I0Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
I Id. at 1072 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 1069 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 1069-70 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The State of Wyoming claimed that the establishment of a retirement plan in the present case like the establishment of wages and hours in
National League of Cities is an "employment term," the determination of which is an "attribute
of sovereignty." Brief for State of Wyoming, Et Al. at 18, EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Brief for appellee].
"1 Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1069 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1070 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent also noted the nonfinancial burdens
imposed by ADEA such as the hindrance upon the states in employing those most physically fit
and the impediment on promotional opportunities caused by retaining older workers. Id. at 1071
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger reasoned that "[flack of such opportunities tends
to undermine younger employees' incentive to strive for excellence, and impedes the state from
fulfilling affirmative action objectives." Id.
.. Id. at 1072 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
17 Id.; see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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burdening the social security system and other maintenance pro8
grams."

Chief Justice Burger found further support for his position in the
fact that Congress had inserted exemptions into the Age Act for members of the Armed Forces,' Foreign Service, 120 and federal law enforcement officers, 121 and had also allowed the Civil Service Commission to establish " '[r]easonable exemptions to the provisions of this
section."122 The dissent found it hypocritical and "difficult to grasp"
that the goals of cost reduction and increased promotional opportuni23
ties were recognized on the federal level but not on the state level. 1
The fact that ADEA contained a "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) 124 exception did not appear to the Chief Justice as a
practical solution to the problems caused by ADEA.12 5 The dissent
pointed to the fact that, without statutory guidelines, the courts
which have dealt with the problem of defining a BFOQ have developed a high evidentiary standard 26 which requires an employer to
establish that substantially all members within a class are unable to
. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1072 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The State of Wyoming argued
that this state interest to assure the physical preparedness of law enforcement officers was
supported by the decisions of the Court in Vance v. Bradley, 400 U.S. 93 (1979) (mandatory
retirement of Foreign Service officers at age 60) and Massachusetts Bd. of Retirem. v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1977) (mandatory retirement at age 50 of state law enforcement officers). Brief for
appellee, supra note 113, at 18.
11 10 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982).
iso 22 U.S.C. § 4052 (Supp. IV 1980).
121 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (Supp. V 1981).
121 103 S. Ct. at 1069-70 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 633a(b) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)).
121 Id. at 1071 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
124 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) provides:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e)
of this section where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or where the differentiation
is based on reasonable factors other than age;
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide
employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not
a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such employee
benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual; or
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause.
Id.
M Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1071 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"' Id. Wyoming claimed that the BFOQ exemption was inadequate since it merely resulted in
a "battle of experts" at trial. Brief for appellee, supra note 113, at 15-16. Even though classifications according to age have not been held "suspect" by the Supreme Court, Wyoming maintained that the BFOQ "evidentiary hurdle is so stringent that the effect of its use is to elevate age
discrimination to a strict scrutiny analysis." Id. at 17. Nevertheless, the Commission claimed that
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perform a job efficiently. In the alternative, employers must prove
they have individually examined members over a certain age limit for
27
purposes of dismissal.1
The Chief Justice, turning to the congressional equal protection
power under section five of the fourteenth amendment, observed that
neither the Court nor Congress had determined that discrimination
based upon age violated the fourteenth amendment. 28 Referring to
the mandatory retirement schemes which were upheld against equal
protection challenges in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia 2 9 and Vance v. Bradley,130 the dissent recited the judicial determination that "[i]t [is] not necessary [to be] convinced that equal protection guarantees extend to classes defined by age because governmental
employment is not a fundamental right and those who are mandatorily retired are not a suspect class."' ' Under the rational basis standard, Murgia was upheld on the basis that early retirement helped
assure the physical preparedness of the state's police force and Bradley
was upheld because mandatory retirement assured optimal performance and increased promotional opportunities in the Foreign Service. 132 Chief Justice Burger concluded that Wyoming's mandatory
retirement statute should similarly be upheld under a fourteenth
amendment challenge. 133

ADEA "does not interfere with the state's power to prescribe reasonable qualifications" for state
employees, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), nor with the state's power to discharge
unfit employees, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (Supp. V 1981), nor with the power to discharge
employees 'too old to perform adequately," 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Brief
for appellant, supra note 25, at 10.
127 Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1072 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This response was directed
essentially at the 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) BFOQ. See supra note 124.
Addressing 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. V 1981) of the BFOQ, the dissent similarly contended
that it would be overly burdensome to have Wyoming enact legislation reducing its disability
and health insurance on older employees and probably unfair to these older employees to do so.
Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1071 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see supra note 124.
122 Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1072-73 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
12 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (Massachusett's statute requiring mandatory retirement of state police
upheld against fourteenth amendment equal protection challenge).
130 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (Foreign Service rule requiring retirement at age 60 upheld against fifth
amendment equal protection challenge).
131 Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1073 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
132 Id.
133 Id. Chief Justice Burger maintained that while there is some flexibility in interpreting the
scope of the fourteenth amendment, there is a limit "to which Congress may substitute its own
judgment for that of the states and assume this Court's 'role of final arbiter.' " Id. at 1074
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 205 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)). The Chief Justice contended that "it cannot be said that in applying the Age Act to
the states Congress has acted to enforce equal protection guarantees as they have been defined by
this Court." Id. at 1073 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Justice Powell, in a separate dissent,134 took issue with Justice
Stevens' concurring opinion which construed the granting of the commerce power to the federal government as the central purpose of the
Constitution.1 35 Justice Powell maintained that the establishment of a
national government in a federal system was a far more important
1 36
In
goal to the Founders than the elimination of trade barriers.
addition, the dissent found the tenth amendment, like the other
amendments in the Bill of Rights, to be an explicit restraint upon
national power. 137
IV.

ANALYSIS: NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES ANNIHILATED

National League of Cities appears to have been an aberration in
which the Court attempted to draw an unworkable state sovereignty
line.1 38 The National League of Cities Court confused more than it
clarified 39 when it chose not to apply the rational basis test 40 but

Justice Powell was joined by Justice O'Connor. Id. at 1075.
13- Id. at 1075-76 (Powell, J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 1086 (Powell, J., dissenting). In support of his position, Justice Powell cited to the
delegation of powers in the Constitution, art. I, § 8, in which the commerce clause comes after
the "Power To lay and collect Taxes . . ." and after the power to "provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare... " Id. at 1076-77 (Powell, J., dissenting). The commerce
clause, the dissent continued, is thus grouped together with many other powers and occupies no
position of particular importance. Id. at 1077 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell did not
disagree that the commerce power should not have grown to accommodate the unforeseen
changes in society. Rather, he disagreed with Justice Stevens' opinion that it was the Founder's
intent to have the commerce clause occupy such a prominent position. Id. at 1086 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
117 Id. at 1080 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell maintained that recognition that the
states retained certain sovereign powers was reaffirmed in United Transportation Union, where
operation of a railroad was not considered a state's "constitutionally preserved sovereign function," 455 U.S. at 683, and in FERC, where the issue of whether PURPA "constituted an
invasion of state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment," 456 U.S. at 752, was
considered. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1080 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"I It has been suggested that the sudden shift in the Supreme Court's direction in National
League of Cities together with its overruling of Wirtz was caused by a change in the identity of
the members of the Court. See Florida Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home
Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 153 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing J. NOWAK, J. YOUNG & R.
ROTUNDA, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 159-63 (1978)); N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1983, at
A14.
"' Several commentators have noted that the various formulations offered by Justice
Rehnquist to support his invalidation of the 1974 FLSA amendments are far from clear. See
Tribe, supra note 2, at 1090 ("If [the National League of Cities] decision is justifiable, it is not
...); Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles:
because of any inherent rights of states.
Permutationsof "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L. J. 1165, 1166
(1977) ("But each of those [state sovereignty] interpretations is ruled out by some or another
aspect of the NLC decision itself."); Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1133 ("Perhaps the National
League of Cities opinion was only employing Humpty Dumpty's method in using the language of
state sovereignty." [citing L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, ch. 6, " 'When I use a
114
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rather to take a more active role 141 in adjudicating federal commerce
clause legislation by giving substance to the tenth amendment. 142 The
language of the tenth amendment 41 offers little support for distinguishing between congressional commerce regulation directed at the
144
private sector and similar regulation directed at the public sector.
Further, the National League of Cities Court's use of a "traditional
state activities" analysis 45 to determine the sphere of state activities
immunized1 46 has been criticized as being both an usurpation of conword,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to meanneither more nor less.' "]); Comment, supra note 48, at 197 ("Instead of being the future
touchstone of tenth amendment analysis, National League of Cities may prove so unworkable as
to result in a second death knell for vigorous judicial enforcement of the tenth amendment.").
140 The rational basis test recognizes the plenary nature of Congress' commerce power. The
two requirements of the test have been summarized to be "(1) whether Congress had a rational
basis for finding that [a particular problem] affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis,
whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and appropriate." Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964). Satisfaction of these two requirements
ends the judicial inquiry. See id. at 259. Earlier cases indicated that Congress, being composed of
representatives from the states, is structured to have special competence in dealing with federalstate intergovernmental conflicts. Under this theory, states must resort to the political process to
check excessive federal power rather than to the Court. See generally New York v. United States,
326 U.S. 572, 581-82 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
114-15 (1941); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-80 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
14
Higher levels of judicial scrutiny which involve "compelling interest tests" are usually
rationalized on the basis that minorities do not have the necessary political representation to
protect their "fundamental liberties." See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967). It has been argued that such an elevated level of scrutiny is inappropriate and is
difficult to apply when a state is involved. See Comment, supra note 48, at 191-96.
142 See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITrIONAL LAW §§ 5-20 to 5-22, at 300-18
(1978);
J. NOWAK, J. YOUNc & R. ROTUNDA, HANDBOOK ON CONSTIrTUrIONAL LAW 160-63 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. NOwAK].
14 See supra note 22.
144 At least one commentator has noted that the language of the amerdment would seem to
reserve the same area of autonomy "to the States" and "to the people." See L. TRIBE, supra note
142, at 308 n.9. In Wirtz, the Court appeared to be in agreement with this view when Justice
Harlan stated that:
valid general regulations of commerce do not cease to be regulations of commerce
because a State is involved. If a State is engaging in economic activities that are
validly regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in by private persons,
the State too may be forced to conform its activities to federal regulation. This was
settled by the unanimous decision in United States v. California.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196-97 (citations omitted). Although the National League of Cities Court
overruled Wirtz, Justice Rehnquist distinguished United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175
(1936). See supra note 48.
"I The NationalLeague of Cities Court chose to use a "traditional state activities" test rather
than to draw the line between activities uniquely carried out by the state, such as police and fire
protection, and those in competition with the private sector, such as schools and hospitals. It has
been suggested that the "competition" test would have avoided overruling Wirtz and would
avoid the ambiguities of affording no immunity to state-operated railroads while protecting
state-operated schools and hospitals. See Note, supra note 48, at 253-54.
"I The NationalLeague of Cities Court did not clarify whether state activities are absolutely
protected from commerce clause regulation or are only protected to the extent that such regula-
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gressional authority 147 and an unworkable test for the courts. 148 Because of the ambiguities inherent in the National League of Cities test,
courts which have had to apply the tenth amendment state immunity
9
doctrine have adopted Justice Blackmun's balancing approach.14
The Hodel Court delivered the first blow to National League of
Cities by formulating the three-part test plus balancing. 150 The effect
of the Hodel test, 151 formulated by Justice Marshall, a dissenter in
National League of Cities, was to make it more difficult for a state
claim of immunity to succeed against a federal commerce regulation
by requiring it to overcome these evidentiary "hurdles."'' 52 Yet the
Hodel decision was disappointing in that a complex question embracing states' traditional regulation of land use was resolved very simply
by relying upon the need for direct regulation of the states in the
surface coal mining area and by citing the "wealth of precedent

tions "significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure employer-employee relationships." 426 U.S. at 851; see Note, supra note 48, at 249-50.
Further, while defining the determination of wages and hours of governmental employees
to be "[o]ne undoubted attribute of state sovereignty," National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
845, the Court did not define what other areas of the "employer-employee relationship" might
be included in the sphere of state sovereignty. See J. NOWAK, supra note 142, at 161.
141See Note, supra note 48, at 254.
148 "What might have been viewed in an earlier day as an improvident 6r even dangerous
extension of state activities may today be deemed indispensable." New York v. United States, 326
U.S. 572, 591 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting). One commentator has noted that "a town's water
supply, a sewage disposal system and a public transportation company have been characterized
as traditional state functions" while "supplying gas or electricity, the New York Port Authority
and a city's elevated railway have been held nontraditional functions." Comment, supra note 48,
at 192 (citations omitted); see also Kilberg & Fort, supra note 48, at 615 n.23; Schwartz, supra
note 2, at 1128-29. Aside from being a difficult distinction to make, the distinction itself has been
criticized as illogical. See Tribe, supra note 2, at 1072-76.
141See, e.g., Woods v. Homes & Structures, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296-97 (D. Kan. 1980);
Colorado v. Veterans Admin., 430 F. Supp. 551, 559 (D. Colo. 1977), modified, 602 F.2d 926
(10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980). Other courts have combined both the
majority traditional governmental function displacement test with the balancing test. See, e.g.,
Public Serv. Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 587 F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 879 (1979); Usery v. Edward J. Meyer Memorial Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368,
1369-70 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). Several commentators have noted that since Justice Blackmun cast
the fifth vote in National League of Cities, no standard more severe than his "balancing
approach" to state immunity would develop. See J.NOWAK, supra note 142, at 162-63; Kilberg &
Fort, supra note 48, at 616 n.26.
1-'See Comment, The Supreme Court Rejects Constitutional Challenges to the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Hodel v. Indiana, 48 BROOKLYN L. REv. 137, 158 (1981).
151Since Justice Marshall dissented in National League of Cities, it would appear that his
motive in articulating a test is to solidify the requirements and hence increase the difficulties for a
state claim to succeed.
"52In Wyoming, Justice Brennan referred to the Hodel test as "hurdles." Wyoming, 103 S.Ct.
at 1060.
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[which] attests to congressional authority to displace or pre-empt state
laws regulating private activity affecting interstate commerce. "153
The Court in United Transportation Union provided little additional clarification of the National League of Cities decision by holding that "[flederal regulation of state-owned railroads simply does not
impair a state's ability to function as a state.' 1 54 The National League
of Cities Court already had reaffirmed United States v. California, in
which federal regulation of a state-owned railroad was similarly sustained on the basis that state-operated railroads were outside a state's
155
traditional function.
FERC marked a significant turning point in the evolution of the
National League of Cities doctrine. 56 In that case, Justice Blackmun
avoided using the Hodel test and instead utilized only his balancing
approach.15 7 In so doing, Justice Blackmun deemphasized state sovereignty and ignored the fact that the federal Act regulated the "States
as States" in the capacity of state utility commissions. 5 8 In concluding
that the adjudication of federal disputes by the state utility commissions was an activity usually engaged in by the state authorities, 5 9 the
FERC majority was balancing the minimal displacement of state
activities against a significant federal interest in energy conservation. 160

In Wyoming the Court eviscerated National League of Cities by
sustaining application of ADEA to the states. ' 6 Significantly, Justice

Hodel, 452 U.S. at 290; see Comment, supra note 150, at 174.
United Transp. Union, 455 U.S. at 686. The third requirement of the test thereby was not
satisfied.
15 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854 n.18. The California Court had held that a
state-operated railroad is subject to the Federal Appliance Act. United States v. California, 297
U.S. 175, 185 (1936). The Supreme Court has also held that a state-owned railroad must comply
with the Interstate Commerce Act. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 564 & n.10 (1957).
1s6 Hodel and United TransportationUnion were both judgments by a unanimous Court and
each failed the three-prong test for predictable reasons. See supra notes 67-84 and accompanying
text. In contrast, FERC was a five-four decision. See supra note 89. Hence, Justice Blackmun
controlled the opinion via his balancing approach. See supra note 149.
" The lack of emphasis on state sovereignty immunity and the sidestepping of the Hodel
three-prong test were noted by Justice O'Connor in her dissent. FERC, 456 U.S. at 781-82 & n.9.
I5 at 769.
Id.
'I' ld. at 760.
'5o See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
161 In FERC, the majority distinguished National League of Citieson the basis that it involved
"the State's ability 'to structure employer-employee relationships,' . . . while providing 'those
governmental services which [its] citizens require.' " FERC, 456 U.S. at 769 n.32, 782 n.9
(quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851, 847). FERC, the Court maintained,
"hold[s] only that Congress may impose conditions on the State's regulation of private conduct in
a pre-emptible area." Id. Hence, Wyoming squarely addressed the issue of employer-employee
relationships as involved in National League of Cities. See Brief for appellee, supra note 113, at
'51
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Brennan chose to address the constitutionality of ADEA's extension to
the states based upon Congress' commerce power 6 2 rather than on
section five of the fourteenth amendment.16 3 In so doing, he directly
64
confronted National League of Cities.
Perhaps out of need to retain Justice Blackmun's vote, 6 5 Justice
Brennan, although superficially employing the Hodel test,1 66 used a
balancing approach16 7 and distinguished, rather than overruled, National League of Cities.18 Justice Brennan's assertion that "the degree
of federal intrusion in this case is sufficiently less serious than it was in
National League of Cities" and hence fails the third prong of the
test 6 9 strongly suggests that the same result would be reached through
70
a pure balancing approach.
Distinguishing National League of Cities on the basis that the
financial impact of FLSA on the states would result in the loss of
important state programs ' 7 is unconvincing. The financial impacts of
FLSA 172 and ADEA 173 upon the states were analyzed by the National
League of Cities and Wyoming majorities respectively and, in each

11, 18; Supplemental Brief for State of Wyoming, Et Al. at 3, EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct.
1054 (1983). Nevertheless, the Wyoming Court attempted to distinguish National League of
Cities. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
162 Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1060, 1064.
163 Upholding application of ADEA to the states on fourteenth amendment grounds would
appear to be easier than basing it on commerce power. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) ("[T]he Civil War Amendments . . . were specifically designed as an
expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty."); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 456 (1976) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which
it embodies, . . . are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966) ("[T]he Fifteenth
Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power."); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 646 (1966) (Supreme Court held § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 "is a proper exercise
of the powers granted to Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment" and thereby reversed
lower court ruling which held that Act "usurped powers reserved to the States by the Tenth
Amendment"); see also Comment, supra note 48, at 190-91.
164 Justice Brennan appeared to have intentions of undercutting National League of Cities in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer where he maintained that the 1972 amendments of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act were valid not only under the fourteenth amendment, as the majority held, but also
under the commerce power. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 457-58 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
165 See N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1983, at A20, col. 3.
166 Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1060-62, 1064 n.17.
67 See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
168 Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062-64; see also N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1983, at A20, col. 3.
196 Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
170See id. at 1064 n.17.
17 Id. at 1062-63.
112 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 846.
"I Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062-63, 1070-71 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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case, no definitive conclusion could be reached. 74 Moreover, the
National League of Cities Court conceded that "particularized assessments of actual impact are [not] crucial to resolution of the issue....
[A]pplication [of the FLSA amendments] will nonetheless significantly alter or displace the State's abilities to structure employeremployee relationships.... . .. Significantly, the State of Wyoming
argued precisely this point-that ADEA would alter the state's employer-employee relations since "[t]he establishment of retirement systems for state employees is nothing more or less than the setting of an
employment term."' 7 6 Justice Brennan nevertheless chose to emphasize the "degree of federal intrusion" upon the employment relationship rather than the intrusion itself. 177 Although it can be argued that
ADEA is more intrusive than FLSA by forcing a state to retain undesired employees rather than allowing states to select whichever employees it wants simply at minimum wage, 178 Justice Brennan saw the
7
intrusion mitigated by the BFOQ exemption.1
In his dissent, which focused on the commerce clause support of
ADEA, Chief Justice Burger understandably recognized that the facts
of National League of Cities could not easily be distinguished from
those in Wyoming. 8 0 Chief Justice Burger's argument that the fourteenth amendment provides no congressional authority for passage of
ADEA,' 8 1 however, is more difficult to comprehend. According to the
Chief Justice, "Congress has [not] acted to enforce equal protection
guarantees as they have been defined by this Court.' 8 2 Yet the language of section five of the fourteenth amendment gives Congress
"power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the
174 See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851;
Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1063, 1070
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
175 National League of Cities, 426 U.S.
at 851. The restriction of choices in the state's
employment relations and the nonfinancial hardships were also analyzed for FLSA, see id. at
848, and for ADEA, see Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1071 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The National
League of Cities Court similarly concluded that the federal regulation "would forbid such
[employment] choices by the States." National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 848.
176 Brief for appellee, supra note 113, at 18.
17
Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062 (emphasis added). See also id. at 1061 n.l where Justice
Brennan states that not "every state employment decision" should "be understood ... to be an
exercise of an 'undoubted attribute of state sovereignty.' " See supra note 146.
178 See N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1983, at A20, col.
2.
171 Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
10 Id. at 1068-72 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
1s' Id. at 1072-75 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 1073 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger also stated that "no one-not

the Court, not the Congress-has determined that mandatory retirement plans violate any rights
protected by [the fourteenth amendment]." Id. (footnote omitted). Then he added the curious
footnote stating that "[t]he ability of Congress to define independently protected classes is an
issue that need not be resolved here because I think that the Age Act is unconstitutional even if it
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fourteenth amendment]. "183 Nowhere does the Constitution indicate
that Congress is limited in its section five powers to those classes
defined by the Court to be in special need of equal protection guarantees.' 84 On the contrary, the Court has interpreted section five to be a
plenary power '8 5 subject only to a rational basis test.' 86 As a result,
Congress may not merely prohibit a per se violation of the amendment,187 but may also prohibit conduct which might reasonably be
88
expected to result in such a violation.

The standards the Court employs to evaluate claims made
against the states under the equal protection clause do not apply to
is assumed that Congress has this power." Id. at 1073 n.6 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). It would appear that Congress is independently defining age as a protected class
pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment and that this is precisely the issue.
183 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also section one of the fourteenth amendment which
provides that a state shall not enact any laws that "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."
8, See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
185See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
Amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions
they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil
rights and the equal protection of the laws against state denial or invasion, if not
prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.
Id. at 345-46; Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) ("By including § 5 the draftsmen
sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment,
the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art I, § 8, cl18."); accord
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 324-27 (1966).
186 The Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), stated:
It was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to assess and weigh the
various conflicting considerations-the risk or pervasiveness of the discrimination in
governmental services, the effectiveness of eliminating the state restriction on the
right to vote as a means of dealing with the evil, the adequacy or availability of
alternative remedies, and the nature and significance of the state interests that would
be affected. . . . It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these
factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress
might resolve the conflict as it did.
Id. at 653; accord South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-27 (1966); City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980).
' See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 133-34 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966); accord City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173-78 (1980);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 333-34 (1966).
"' See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1966); accord City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 216 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Congress may also require conduct it reasonably considers
necessary to correct past misconduct. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-78
(1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.); id. at 503-04 (Powell, J., concurring). While the Court has
maintained that state behavior which results in a discriminatory impact, without discriminatory
intent, is not in violation of the equal protection clause, Congress is authorized by section five to
prohibit such behavior if such prohibition would be "appropriate legislation" to enforce the
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Congress. Such judicial determinations provide no basis to limit congressional enforcement power under section five.'1 9 The appropriate
judicial inquiry in determining the validity of ADEA is whether Congress rationally believed that arbitrary age discrimination by the state
was in violation of the equal protection clause, and if so, whether the
Age Act is a "reasonable and appropriate" means of enforcing the
provisions of the amendment.' 9 0 The legislative history of ADEA provides ample support for Congress rationally to believe that ADEA was
"appropriate legislation" to enforce the fourteenth amendment,'1' and
the judicial history of ADEA indicates that enactment was an appropriate exercise of section five power. 192
Assuming that Congress has the power to extend coverage of
ADEA to the states, the wisdom of enacting the Age Act with numerous exceptions for federal employees without affording the states similar flexibility' 9 3 is questionable. 194 An equitable solution would be for
Congress to insert into the BFOQ exception state employee exemp-

substantive provisions of the amendment. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (state
employment test which has racially disproportionate impact held not violative of equal protection clause); Massachusetts v. Feeney, 434 U.S. 884 (1977) (veteran's employment preference
held not violative of equal protection clause even though it has a disproportionate impact on
women); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirem. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (state mandatory
retirement statute for state police officers sustained).
I Defining "suspect classes" on the basis that these groups have inadequate political representation to enforce their equal protection guarantees has relevance in judicial actions against the
states. See Wyoming, 103 S.Ct. at 1073-74; supra note 188. Such judicial classifications have no
relevance to independent congressional determinations of classes to be protected by section five
"appropriate legislation." See supra notes 185-88.
"I See supra notes 185-89; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 25859 (1964) for rational basis test applied to plenary commerce power. " '[A]ppropriate legislation'
to enforce the Equal Protection Clause" has been defined by the Court to be legislation which
"may be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, . . . is 'plainly
adapted to that end' and ... is not prohibited by but is consistent with 'the letter and the spirit
of the constitution.' " Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
"I,See Justice Brennan's review of the legislative history of ADEA and its connection with the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Wyoming, 103 S.Ct. at 1957-59; Brief for appellant, supra note 25, at
31-34.
"I See Wyoming, 103 S.Ct. at 1059 & n.6; Brief for appellant, supra note 25, at 36-37; see
also Kilberg & Fort, supra note 48, at 621-23; Note, supra note 48, at 266-72.
"I Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1071. The State of Wyoming in fact argued that its retirement
statute should survive a balancing approach since the many federal exceptions to ADEA attested
to the fact that Congress had "no supervening federal interest" in barring early retirement. Brief
for appellee, supra note 113, at 19.
I" The majority responded to this point by indicating that once Congress has indicated the
strength of its interest, it is not for the Court to psychoanalyze the sincerity of Congress' interest
in subsequent "political decisionmaking." Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1064, n.17.
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tions for the same types of occupations recognized as warranting early
retirement at the federal level. 9 5
Wyoming appears to be the culmination of a series of cases which
have increasingly isolated National League of Cities.1 Not only has
Wyoming confronted the issue of a federal statute directly regulating
the state's employer-employee relationship,1 7 but it has done so on
commerce clause terms.19 8 While the majority avoided explicitly overruling the 1976 decision by narrowly distinguishing it on its fact
20 0
pattern, 9 9 it effectively has overruled National League of Cities.
Yet, because National League of Cities and Wyoming were both five
to four decisions, the direction of the Court in this important area is
difficult to predict.
Richard R. Muccino
'0
Since most state mandatory retirement laws are directed at the area of law enforcement,
an area recognized by the federal government to warrant early retirement, there would appear
to be few points of conflict. See Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1069-70 & n.2.
196See supra notes 69-92 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
'9'
See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
"I Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062-64. But see id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting), where Justice
Stevens is not so restrained.
200 See N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1983, at A20 and July 10, 1983, at 18.

